A -An Objective Mens Rea
The concept of an objective mens rea standard in the criminal law is controversial. This is despite the fact that examples of its existence are readily at hand: manslaughter by reason of criminal negligence or causing grievous bodily harm by negligent act, being just two examples.
Traditionally, criminal culpability has been connected conceptually to the guilty mind of the defendant. Such a principle was as clear in Lord Coke's 17th Century maxim actus no facit eum nisi mens sit rea -that is, an act does not make someone guilty unless their mind is also guilty -as it remained in the early 20th Century formulation proffered by C S Kenny that 'no external conduct, however serious or even fatal its consequences may have been, is ever punished unless it is produced by some form of mens rea '. 5 One major justification for a focus on such subjectivism has been that the development of mens rea requirements in the criminal law was a civilising move away from an unjust focus on the actus reus alone that may have characterised criminal law systems of the past. In this way, for some, mens rea requirements play a significant role in contemporary justifications for criminal punishment, legitimising the intervention of the State into the lives of citizens. 6 Of course, this narrative of gradual if inevitable progress is overly simplistic. Defendants can be found guilty of a crime without knowledge of the content of the law, for example, as ignorance of the law is said never to excuse a defendant. Similarly, arguably, with latemodernity has come the invention of new strict liability crimes, such as those relating to Law' (2000) A major concern with the new amendments and notions of objective fault is that they fail to distinguish between people acting intentionally or recklessly and those that have merely taken less care than the reasonable person. There are clearly two different levels of moral culpability, but under the current law they are treated the same.
The typical response of legislatures in creating offences with an objective mens rea has been to recognise a lower level of culpability through the provision of significantly lower maximum penalties. We shall consider the possibility of a separate offence of negligent sexual assault below.
B -Two Levels of Culpability
The taskforce briefly considered a suggestion to introduce a separate offence with a lower maximum penalty for sexual assaults in which the defendant had an honest but unreasonable belief the complainant was consenting. The suggestion was to include a s61IA:
"Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of the other person and who fails to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether the other person consented, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years." 12
Among the benefits of this suggestion were to avoid the problem which arises under the current system, whereby the sentencing judge may be left unaware of the jury's grounds for conviction (although to some extent the culpability of the accused could be taken into account on sentencing without having separate offences). In addition, other ramifications associated with the label of an offence may fail to take into account the lesser level of culpability, such as blacklisting through a criminal record and offender registries. One concern with this suggestion has been that having separate offences may lead to compromised verdicts, as juries opt to take the lesser statutory offence. Surely though, this
should not be a concern if we are to hold to a standard of proof that is beyond reasonable doubt.
A more compelling objection to the introduction of a second offence involving a lower level of culpability lies in the highly political debate about the rights of complainants. It is difficult to imagine how a lawyer might justify to a complainant why the attack on them deserved a lesser penalty: is rape not just rape? To the layperson, by separating assailants into different levels of culpability, complainants may possibly feel that they are likewise being ranked.
Evidence surrounding the complainant's behaviour is likely to enter the court room, and the result might appear to be that some complainants had led their assailants on. Would the message be that some complainants are virtuous and have been raped, while others should exercise more responsibility for their actions?
At a formal level, this objection rests on an inaccurate impression of criminal justice. Strictly speaking, the criminal law judges the actions and intentions of the accused, and makes no statement regarding the behaviour of the complainant. The verdict reveals that the defendant did not have reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was consenting. The trouble is, in the murkiness of a sexual assault trial, the practical effect might still be the separation of complainants into categories. These are only possibilities, and of course, arguments guessing public reaction and assumptions about lay opinions are weak. However, it warrants consideration whether the possible harm caused to complainants may not be commensurate with a more appropriate label for the defendant's crime. This is an old issue arising from the conflict between lay perceptions of the criminal law, and what the law tells itself. It manifests in the politically charged question: to what extent are a complainant's interests taken into account during the criminal justice process? Criminal justice has always erred on the side of the defendant. This is necessarily so, as a check on the courts' power to deprive an accused of their liberty -they cannot lock away the complainant.
C -Reasonable grounds: The Victim on Trial?
In either the legislation's current form, or in a graduated liability structure, negligent sexual assault trials may have the opposite effect on a complainant's experience of justice than that anticipated by the legislature. It may be that in its attempt to extend further protection to complainants of sexual assault, the legislature has inadvertently created a situation in which a complainant's actions will become the primary focus of sexual assault trials.
Where a defendant claims they believed a complainant was consenting to sex, the jury is required to have regard to 'all the circumstances of the case' in determining whether there were reasonable grounds for that belief. Naturally, the words and conduct of the complainant preceding sexual intercourse are likely to be included for examination. In addition, facts the defendant knew about the complainant and even things the defendant had heard about the complainant could be considered relevant to determining whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for their belief.
At present, the extent to which the subjective features of the defendant may be taken into account in determining whether they had reasonable grounds is something that is yet to be determined. 14 As a result, the exact evidence that may be taken into account in making the jury's determination remains unclear, but enough is clear to show that the jury will be, to a large degree, passing judgment on the actions of the complainant as much as the actions of the defendant.
Where a jury finds that a defendant's belief that a complainant was consenting was reasonable, the jury will be in effect concluding that it was the actions of the complainant which brought about the sexual assault. Defence barristers, more than ever, will be encouraged by the law to argue that any reasonable person, faced with the actions of the 14 See generally, Dobinson and Townsley, above n 1.
complainant and their history, would have concluded they were consenting. Trials turning on such archaic notions would be a travesty. It may be commented that at least in practical terms the position did not differ before the amendments. Nonetheless, the distinction after the reforms is that the law now actively encourages juries to engage in this form of reasoning, giving them a duty to consider 'all the circumstances of the case' in measuring the grounds for the defendant's belief. The view that some victims may contribute to their sexual assault is now ingrained in the letter of the law.
Yet in introducing the legislation, the Attorney-General John Hatzistergos stressed the difficulties that complainants already face with jurors who continue to hold 'stereotypical beliefs about rape and its victims'. He cited a study by the Australian Institute of Criminology that revealed that 'juror judgments in rape trials are influenced more by the attitudes, beliefs and biases about rape that jurors bring with them into the courtroom than by the objective facts presented'. Some jurors, he continued, 'still hold the view that women often say "no" when they mean "yes", that women who are raped often ask for it, and that rape results from men not being able to control their need for sex and responsibility for rape is therefore removed'. 15 It may be a cruel twist of irony that the government's attempts to change juror attitudes in fact give their existing attitudes a more powerful role in resolving sexual assault trials.
III -A Tort of Sexual Assault
In cases of negligent sexual assault, reality becomes splintered. There are two alternative experiences of one event: for the defendant, it was consensual sex; while for the complainant, it was sexual assault. Unlike other legal disputes where one single factual account can be distilled and conflict arises over the application of legal principles, here the law is being asked to intervene in a space between subjective realities. The dispute sharply reveals the probabilities. 21 In contrast, consent is part of the actus reus under the criminal law and must be established by the prosecution. The change in the onus and burden of proof would be a procedural advantage to complainants under tort law.
B -Negligence
Under the current law of negligence, the plaintiff would need to establish a duty of care, breach of that duty and damage caused by the breach that is not too remote. It is still unclear in Australia whether acts amounting to intentional trespass can be pleaded as negligence. In sexual assault cases, the sex act is usually intentional, though the defendant may have been careless in ascertaining consent. The High Court has said in obiter that if the actions of a defendant were intentional, then the claim must be brought in trespass and not negligence. The law of negligence would need to be adapted to incorporate notions of consent for a tort of negligent sexual assault. People would owe a duty of care to ensure consent before engaging in sexual intercourse. This duty would be breached if the defendant had no reasonable grounds to believe the plaintiff was consenting. Causation of damage and remoteness could then follow the general law, being physical or psychological harm. 24 Such a tort would mirror s61HA(3)(c) of the Crimes Act. For the reasons discussed above, a plaintiff might not recover under a tort of negligent sexual assault for intentional sexual assaults, and besides, the label of negligent sexual assault would be inappropriate. Without fundamental changes, negligence does not seem to be the right model on which to base a tort of sexual assault. While it seems apt to bring an action involving an objective standard in negligence, the language of consent is unfamiliar to negligence, while it is a defence to battery. The emphasis in battery is placed upon the disregard of human dignity, while negligence is more concerned with assessing the harm caused.
The tort of battery also has advantages in terms of the amount of damages recoverable by a plaintiff. The most obvious limitation on damages in negligence, the Civil Liability Act, does not apply to 'sexual misconduct'. 25 Nevertheless, battery is actionable without any proof of damage. 26 Under negligence, there might be difficulty establishing a recognised psychiatric illness. 27 Aggravated damages may be awarded depending on the defendant's conduct, but exemplary damages are only likely to be awarded where the sexual assault was intentional.
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C -Problems with a Tort of Sexual Assault
There are major concerns with a tort claim for sexual assault. Perhaps most obviously is the extent to which damages might appropriately remedy the harm suffered in a sexual assault.
This issue has both a philosophical and practical dimension. First, money may be seen as a vastly inadequate response to the non-financial damage occasioned by sexual assault. The last issue will necessarily arise wherever the law attempts to protect both victim and accused in an uneasy legal compromise. The most that can be said in this regard is that the distinction between tort and criminal liability is perhaps the most appropriate line to draw to strike a balance between the rights of the victim and those of the accused. In the context of a criminal trial, the right of an accused to a fair trial is unchallengeable. The harm caused by a wrongful conviction prevents any true consideration of a victim's rights. The civil law is better able to juggle the competing rights of the victim and accused, as the defendant's liberty is not at stake.
IV -Conclusions
The issue of consent in the law of sexual assault highlights fundamental conflicts about who the criminal law should ultimately protect. The law as it stood before the introduction of s61HA led to injustice for some complainants of sexual assault; it did not recognise their 'right' to see their assailant punished. However, the legislature's solution in s61HA conflicts with historical and theoretical tenets of the criminal law regarding the culpability of accused persons. The criminal law has traditionally placed a greater emphasis upon the accused's right to be judged according to their subjectively guilty mind.
The insertion of an objective mens rea into sexual assault also fails to reflect different levels of moral culpability for negligent versus intentional or reckless sexual assault. A graded set of sexual assault offences would more appropriately match the crime to the level of moral unfortunate outcome stems from attempts to utilise the criminal law to redress victims' harm, disregarding the important fact that the criminal law has traditionally focused on the culpability of the accused, not the harm caused to the victim.
We have raised the possibility of a separate tort of sexual assault that is more in line with traditional notions of criminal law yet still protects the complainant's rights. Tort liability for sexual assault is possible under existing tort law and offers a range of benefits for complainants, including with regards to the burden and onus of proof, as well as the problems currently experienced by victims when faced with conservative juries. However, tort remedies rely on there being a solvent offender to sue, may implicate complainants in counter claims and may similarly grade victims. While a tort of sexual assault is an unlikely contender for reform, it is nevertheless always useful to be reminded of the alternatives that lie beyond the boundaries of the criminal law and which may be more theoretically consistent in achieving the aims of policymakers. By focusing all of their efforts on reforming the criminal law in attempting to find justice for victims, legislators may have settled on a 'solution' that does not respect traditional legal distinctions and therefore will never satisfy all stakeholders.
